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Top-Down, Bottom-Up, or Both? 
Toward an Integrative Perspective on Operations Strategy Formation 
 
Abstract 
Operations strategy is formed via complex processes that transpire in multiple directions 
at multiple organizational levels. While most previous studies focus on the “macro-level” 
process of strategy formation from the dominant top-down perspective, this study 
investigates the “micro-level” process of strategy formation that governs interactions 
among competitive priorities, objectives, and action plans within operations. Using 111 
(59 top-down and 52 bottom-up) action plans collected from six German manufacturing 
plants, we build on Kim and Arnold’s (1996) framework and propose an integrated 
process model of operations strategy formation that encompasses both top-down planning 
and bottom-up learning. We also identify a contingency factor that affects their balance: 
centralized versus decentralized organizational structure. Finally, based on analysis of 
their respective strategic content, we provide evidence concerning the complementary 
roles of top-down and bottom-up action plans in operations strategy. 
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1. Introduction 
How is operations strategy formed? The process of operations strategy is of considerable 
interest to many scholars but has received relatively less attention than has the content of 
operations strategy (Boyer et al., 2005; Swink and Way, 1995).
1
 The process of 
operations strategy comprises the activities and dynamics of strategy formation and 
implementation (Boyer et al., 2005; Slack and Lewis, 2011; Swink and Way, 1995), 
whereas the content of operations strategy consists of the particular decisions regarding 
competitive priorities, objectives, and action plans that specify the operation’s strategic 
direction. 
Since Skinner (1969) first postulated that manufacturing tasks should support 
corporate objectives, operations strategy formation has been conceptualized as a top-
down process of “formulation and implementation” within the guidelines of overall 
corporate strategy. Wheelwright’s (1984) well-known framework represents this high-
level view of manufacturing strategy within an organizational hierarchy. He argues that a 
company’s preferred positioning in the market should determine the competitive 
priorities of operations. Given its role in supporting corporate strategy, an operations 
strategy is perceived to make decisions about developing the structure, infrastructure, and 
capabilities to support those competitive priorities. 
This top-down perspective has been widely accepted and dominated empirical 
studies on the process of operations strategy (Marucheck et al., 1990; Menda and Dilts, 
1997; Schroeder et al., 1986; Swamidass, 1986; Ward et al., 1996; Ward and Duray, 
2000). However, a few case studies have documented an alternative process—of bottom-
                                                        
1 Boyer et al. (2005) report that, of the 31 operations strategy articles published in the Production and Operations 
Management Society journal since its founding, only 8 are process related. 
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up operations strategy—that emerges in the absence, or lack, of a corporate (or strategic 
business unit) strategy (Barnes, 2002; Slack and Lewis, 2011; Swamidass et al., 2001). 
These scholars argue that, in practice, operations strategy is formed in a more complex 
process than the top-down “formulation and implementation”, and they identify the need 
to document more real-world processes. This is the starting point of our study. 
Especially, most of previous studies have examined the process of operations 
strategy at the “macro-level” by focusing on hierarchical relationships and the external 
consistency between operations strategy and corporate and/or other functional strategies 
(Barnes, 2002; Marucheck et al., 1990; Menda and Dilts, 1997; Schroeder et al., 1986; 
Slack and Lewis, 2011; Swamidass, 1986; Swamidass et al., 2001; Ward et al., 1996; 
Ward and Duray, 2000). In contrast, Kim and Arnold (1996) ground the process of 
operations strategy at the “micro-level” by investigating the internal consistency among 
manufacturing’s competitive priorities, objectives, and action plans based on the top-
down assumption. Yet because their study relied on survey data, the authors were unable 
to investigate the actual process by which competitive priorities are translated into action 
plans, and vice versa. 
Hence, our study aims to fill this gap in the literature by exploring the internal 
process of operations strategy as actually practiced. Using information on six German 
manufacturing plants and their 111 strategic action plans, we build on Kim and Arnold’s 
(1996) top-down framework and propose an integrated process model of operations 
strategy formation that incorporates both top-down and bottom-up perspectives. We also 
explore organizational factors—such as competitive priorities, organizational structure, 
and size—that influence the extent to which action plans are stipulated top-down or 
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emerge bottom-up. Furthermore, we delve into the strategic content of both types of 
action plans to explain their respective roles in operations strategy. 
In this study, we posit that operations strategy is formed through an iterative 
process of integrating competitive priorities, objectives, and action plans that are partly 
induced by top-down planning and partly emerge from bottom-up learning. Top-down 
action plans tend to reflect top management’s strategic intentions with regard to the 
organization’s specified priorities while bottom-up action plans tend to arise in the areas 
of operational practices and processes—the domain of lower-level managers’ expertise. 
Thus, our findings suggest that top-down and bottom-up action plans serve 
complementary roles in the formation of operations strategy. Additionally, our results 
show that decentralized organizations adopt relatively more bottom-up actions than 
centralized organizations do.  
Our study makes several contributions to the operations strategy literature. First, it 
fills a void in the literature of operations strategy by investigating the internal processes 
governing the interactions among competitive priorities, objectives, and action plans. 
Second, this study contributes to a mid-range extension of the theory on the operations 
strategy process by documenting the existence of bottom-up action plans with reference 
to Kim and Arnold’s (1996) top-down framework; we believe that our paper is the first 
attempt to integrate the top-down and bottom-up perspectives on the formation of 
operations strategy from competitive priorities to action plans. Third, this research 
enhances our understanding of top-down and bottom-up integration by identifying a 
contingency factor—namely, centralized versus decentralized organizational structure—
that affects the balance between top-down planning and bottom-up learning. Finally, our 
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study substantiates the roles of top-down and bottom-up action plans in operations 
strategy by examining the strategic content of those plans. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The literature is reviewed in 
Section 2, and the methodology is explained in Section 3. Within-case and cross-case 
analyses are presented in Section 4 and Section 5, respectively. We discuss our findings 
and propositions in Section 6, and the paper’s limitations and contributions are 
summarized in Section 7. 
2. Literature Review 
2.1. Process of Operations Strategy 
Although there is no generally accepted definition of operations strategy, it is expected to 
specify competitive priorities and objectives for the operations function in alignment with 
the firm’s overall business strategy, and to pursue them through consistent patterns of 
actions (Skinner, 1969; Slack and Lewis, 2011; Wheelwright, 1984). Following the 
dominant top-down perspective, Kim and Arnold (1996) develop a hierarchical process 
model that delineates competitive priorities, manufacturing objectives, and action plans in 
the choice of improvement programs (see Figure 1). In line with Wheelwright (1984), 
Kim and Arnold (1996) suggest that competitive priorities describe a company’s 
preferred dimensions of competitive advantage and largely determine the relative 
emphasis that the operations function places on such capabilities as cost, quality, 
dependability, and/or flexibility. Based on the firm’s competitive priorities, they argue 
that operations managers should articulate measureable performance objectives and 
generate action plans to implement. Since each action plan requires the allocation of 
scarce resources, managers should assess, prior to adopting one, its expected effect on 
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specific performance objectives. Thus, Kim and Arnold’s model postulates top-down 
action plans that are carefully “formulated and implemented” in alignment with 
competitive priorities and objectives. 
 
However, proponents of continuous improvement argue for bottom-up action plans that 
emerge from lower-level organizational members working in day-to-day operations. For 
instance, operations-based managerial innovations, such as Just-In-Time (JIT)/lean 
manufacturing and Six Sigma/Total Quality Management, emphasize bottom-up 
organizational learning for continuous improvement through employee involvement, 
cross-functional communication, and feedback across all organizational layers (Deming, 
1992; Womack et al., 1990). Although such improvement programs are often adopted 
and implemented by top management, the proponents of JIT and TQM emphasize linking 
top management’s strategic goals with the daily management of operations at lower 
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Figure 1:  A Process Model of Manufacturing Strategy (adopted from Kim and Arnold,1996) 
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Choice of improvement programs 
Business Strategy 
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levels via employee participation in devising action plans (e.g., hoshin kanri; Witcher and 
Butterworth, 2001). The essence of these initiatives is to create communication channels 
for new ideas and to involve lower-level organizational members in collaborative 
decision making and problem solving (Witcher and Butterworth, 2001). 
Generally speaking, it is top management’s responsibility to establish the overall 
goals and objectives for an organization and to allocate resources, whereas the actions 
required to achieve those objectives are usually carried out by lower-level organizational 
members (Bower, 1974; Burgelman, 1983; Burgelman and Grove, 2007; Mintzberg, 
1978; Mintzberg and Waters, 1985). The distance in the organizational hierarchy between 
top management and lower-level members creates a gap between managerial intentions 
and organizational actions that can lead to a discrepancy between “intended” and 
“realized” strategies (Mintzberg, 1978). 
This discrepancy between managerial intentions and the actions of an 
organization’s employees raises the issue of coordination and is a source of variation in 
the extent of planning and control when operations strategy is formed. In their study on 
deliberate and emergent strategies, Mintzberg and Waters (1985) argue that the 
coordination process can be guided by a plan as an intended strategy in which long-term 
goals and intentions are specified prior to actions, or emerge from patterns in action over 
time in the absence of, or despite, intentions. Similarly, Burgelman (1983; Burgelman 
and Grove, 2007) argues that some initiatives autonomously emerge from middle-level 
managers in search for new opportunities while the majority of strategic initiatives are 
induced by managerial intentions. 
Thus, we conjecture that the process of coordinating managerial intentions (i.e., 
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competitive priorities and objectives) and actions can be induced top-down as well as 
autonomously emerge from bottom-up in operations strategy formation. 
2.2. Top-Down versus Bottom-Up Strategy Formation 
What are the main distinctions between top-down and bottom-up strategy formation? The 
top-down process can be described as the planned coordination of intentions and actions 
to achieve specific outcomes imposed by a central authority, as described by Kim and 
Arnold (1996). Top management specifies its long-term goals, intentions and means prior 
to actions in the form of a plan and elaborates the plan in as much detail as possible to 
translate it into collective actions with a minimum of discretion left (Bower, 1974; 
Burgelman, 1983; Burgelman and Grove, 2007; Mintzberg and Waters, 1985). Some 
strategies might not be carried out as intended whereas other strategies accurately reflect 
intentions, yet fail to achieve the desired outcomes—perhaps because of a turbulent 
environment (Mintzberg and Waters, 1985). Based on the initial outcomes, top 
management reinforces or modifies its plans as appropriate. 
In contrast, a bottom-up strategy can emerge as an unplanned pattern of actions 
and may realize outcomes not initially intended by top management (Bower, 1974; 
Burgelman, 1983; Burgelman and Grove, 2007; Mintzberg and Waters, 1985). As 
remarked by Mintzberg and Waters (1985), no action transpires in the total absence of 
intention. Top management may offer some broad direction yet refrain from specifying 
detailed actions for every operational decision in the cascade of organizational hierarchy. 
In this context, middle managers can autonomously undertake strategic initiatives to 
identify specific actions that will serve their objectives in line with the firm’s broad 
direction and/or to search for new opportunities that could advance their career prospects 
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within the organization (Burgelman, 1983; Burgelman and Grove, 2007; Nonaka, 1988). 
Slack and Lewis (2011) describe the principle governing a bottom-up perspective of 
operations strategy as shaping “objectives and action, at least partly by the knowledge it 
gains from its day-to-day activities” (p. 13). In this study, we document how a 
manufacturer’s operations objectives and action plans are shaped, at least in part, by 
autonomous initiatives that emerge in the absence of, or despite, top management’s prior 
intentions. 
In sum, a top-down strategy can be distinguished from a bottom-up strategy in 
terms of two characteristics: (i) the initiative’s origin and (ii) the sequence of events 
among intentions, actions, and outcomes. Top-down strategy is triggered by top 
management’s intentions and manifests in the performance outcomes of stipulated 
actions. Bottom-up strategy is initiated by lower managers’ actions representing their 
own interpretations of the company’s directions, which may partially differ from top 
management’s prior intentions. Based on these distinctions, we categorize the strategic 
action plans of six German manufacturing plants into two groups—top-down and bottom-
up—and examine how the plans are formed, the organizational factors that affect their 
formation, and their strategic content. Our purpose is to map out the formation process of 
top-down and bottom-up operations strategy by investigating how action plans are 
formed in practice and how they interact with competitive priorities and objectives within 
operations. 
3. Methodology and Case Descriptions 
3.1. Case Selection 
Data were collected as a part of a research project addressing the operations and 
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technology strategy implementation of European manufacturers (see Sting and Loch, 
2012). Six German manufacturing plants were selected from the finalists of INSEAD’s 
Industrial Excellence Award (IEA) competition between 2005 and 2008. After obtaining 
the interviews and organization charts of all finalist firms from the IEA database, we 
chose our sample plants based on the following theoretical sampling (Yin 2009). First, 
we selected plants operating within a single country (Germany) but in diverse industries; 
thus we minimized cultural differences in strategy processes while retaining some 
variation in manufacturing practices and processes. Second, we chose plants whose top 
management teams had more than four years of tenure as well as the autonomy to devise 
their own operations strategy. Third, since the organizational structure can affect the 
decision-making process (Siggelkow and Levinthal, 2003), we chose two plants with a 
centralized structure and two with a decentralized structure. This initial sampling scheme, 
however, resulted in a size disparity between centralized and decentralized plants: the 
latter had a greater number of employees. To reduce any sampling bias associated with 
size and to approach “theoretical saturation” (Eisenhardt, 1989), we augmented the initial 
sample by adding one larger plant with a centralized structure and one smaller plant with 
a decentralized structure (see Section 5.1 for details). All six manufactures we contacted 
agreed to participate in the study. Hence, our final sample includes six German 
manufacturers featuring different organizational characteristics.  
3.2. Data Collection 
The on-site visits and interviews for this research study were carried out in 2009. During 
the visits and interviews, we learned that each manufacturer had a set of high-priority 
action plans (called “strategic initiatives” or “strategic projects”, depending on the 
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organization) that were being implemented, formally tracked, and officially budgeted by 
top management. In order to establish whether those plans were driven by top 
management or instead emerged from people lower down in the organization without top 
management’s prior intentions, we collected from each manufacturer the entire set of 
such action plans underway at the time of this study. Thus, we employed a multiple case 
study design with an embedded unit of analysis—that is, six manufacturers representing 
cases with embedded strategic initiatives (Yin, 2009, p. 46). For consistency in Kim and 
Arnold’s (1996) terminology, we refer to both “strategic initiatives” and “strategic 
projects” as “action plans” hereafter. 
We collected data by interviewing top management on-site and then using the 
interview responses to compile lists of action plans; this procedure enabled us to obtain, 
for each action plan, a content description and the names of the key personnel involved. 
Semi-structured follow-up interviews were conducted with various organizational 
members at multiple levels of management: top, middle, and frontline (see the Appendix 
for the condensed interview protocol). Top management includes the unit head (CEO in 
one case, division manager in two cases, and functional head in three cases) and 
immediate subordinates, and frontline management is the lowest level with staff 
responsibility; middle management refers to all managerial positions in between. We 
recruited one to seven informants at each level who were involved in action plans and 
were also willing to participate in the study (see the detailed breakdown of informants by 
management level and organization in Table 1). We first conducted individual interviews 
with each informant at the top management level and then performed group interviews—
up to four interviewees—with informants at the middle or frontline management levels. 
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Informants were grouped by the same rank to preclude self-censoring in the presence of 
superiors. Altogether, we conducted interviews with 61 informants and collected data on 
111 action plans from the six manufacturing plants.  
Table 1: Breakdown of Informants by Manufacturer and Management Level 
 
Manufacturer 
Top 
management 
informants 
Middle 
management 
informants 
Frontline 
management 
informants Total 
AUTO 4 4 7 15 
CONTROLLERS 2 4 2 18 
MEDICAL 2 6 4 12 
DRIVES 2 3 3 8 
GLASS 5 4 3 12 
FITTINGS 1 3 2 6 
Total 16 24 21 61 
 
To ensure the validity of the data, we used multiple investigators for investigator 
triangulation (see Patton, 2002) and multiple informants for data triangulation (Yin 
2009, p. 116). First, two authors of the paper together conducted on-site visits and 
interviews while the other author examined the data from a third party perspective. This 
setup can help to mitigate a potential investigator bias. During the interviews, two 
investigators alternately asked questions and took notes for triangulation. To comply with 
the “24-hours rule” (Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 1988), case study reports for each 
manufacturer were written based on the notes immediately after each visit. The case 
write-ups were later combined with the action plan databases. For each manufacturer, we 
then created tables to structure the statements on the evolution of each action plan 
(columns) along the organizational actors and their hierarchical levels (rows). This 
exercise facilitated systematic tracking of the initiation and evolution of each action plan. 
In addition, the authors independently categorized the organizational structure of 
manufacturers as either centralized or decentralized, an exercise that yielded consentient 
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categorizations. 
Second, we validated the data by cross-examining the interview scripts from 
multiple informants on how specific action plans were initiated, developed and 
implemented, and by aligning the details of events across the varying perspectives of top, 
middle, and frontline management. Furthermore, we used organization charts with each 
informant’s task description to triangulate our categorization of centralized versus 
decentralized organizations. Hence our research design employed multiple sources 
(informants) across organizational ranks and so enabled us to identify and validate the 
hierarchy-spanning process of operations strategy formation..  
4. Within-Case Analysis 
The within-case analysis was designed to examine each case as a stand-alone entity 
(Eisenhardt, 1989) and to identify the organization-specific characteristics that might 
influence the process of operations strategy formation. Given the existence of an 
embedded unit of analysis (the action plans), we followed Yin (2009) and began by 
examining organization-level characteristics—here, the firm’s size, competitive priorities, 
and organizational structure. In particular, the manufacturer’s organizational structure 
was categorized as either centralized or decentralized based on the distribution of 
decision-making authority across organizational layers (Siggelkow and Levinthal, 2003). 
For example, we classified a manufacturing unit as “centralized” if decision-making 
authority was vested in the unit’s top management team or as “decentralized” if 
significant decision-making authority devolved to its lower-level members or subunits. 
Table 2 summarizes the examined characteristics. 
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Table 2: Key Characteristics of the Case Study Manufacturing Units 
 
 
 
AUTO CONTROLLERS MEDICAL DRIVES GLASS FITTINGS 
Industry and 
process 
 Car 
components: 
axles, 
gearboxes, 
shaft drives 
 Metalworking 
and assembly 
 Power controllers 
(electrical and 
electronics) for 
machine tools 
 Engineering and 
assembly 
 SME, two 
manager-owners 
 Medical kits for 
ambulances, 
home-care 
devices 
(breathing) 
 Assembly 
 Pneumatic & 
electric drives for 
automated 
machine tools 
 Extrusion, metal-
working, assembly 
 Specialty glass 
tubes for 
industrial 
applications 
 Glass smelting, 
extruding, and 
cutting 
 Brass faucets 
 Forging, surface 
treatment, 
extrusion, and 
assembly 
Competitive 
priorities 
First, most 
innovative; 
second, most 
efficient 
supplier of 
power train 
systems 
First, technology 
leadership; 
second, balanced 
growth in all 
business segments; 
third, total cost 
leadership 
First, product 
innovation; 
second, 
internationalizatio
n (where the latter 
implies 
modularized 
customization) 
Customer 
orientation with 
delivery speed and 
reliability as top 
priorities 
(priorities were 
shifted away from 
cost efficiency) 
Technology 
leadership and 
delivery 
reliability, with 
cost as a 
constraint 
High flexibility, 
time to market and 
the optimum 
balance between 
availability, 
inventory, costs, 
and quality to 
reinforce corporate 
goals and brand 
value 
Organization
al structure 
 Decentralized; 
matrix  
 Centralized; 
divisional 
 Decentralized; 
   functional 
 Decentralized; 
divisional 
 Centralized; 
   functional 
 Centralized; 
   functional 
Size 
(approx.)  
 2,500 
employees 
 700 employees  800 employees  2,400 employees  1,000 employees  530 employees 
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The second step of the within-case analysis focused on action plans embedded within the 
case organizations. Because of geographical and time constraints, we collected cross-
sectional data on ongoing action plans through face-to-face interviews during the visits 
rather than by following the progress of actions over time. Thus, we used retrospective 
questions about how the actions originated and how they earned the support of top 
management. Since there were multiple informants, we were able to cross-reference the 
responses in order to weed out inconsistent reports and to sort action plans into two 
categories—top-down or bottom-up—based on who initiated the action and how it was 
initiated (Yin, 2009). For example, an action initiated by middle or frontline 
management, in the absence of top management’s prior intentions, was classified as 
bottom-up; if top management initiated or required the action, it was classified as top-
down. Table 3 presents the breakdown of action plans for each organization in the study. 
Table 3: Action Plans 
 
 AUTO CONTROLLERS MEDICAL DRIVES GLASS FITTINGS 
Number of 
action plans 
underway 
10 24 16 10 6 45 
Number 
(percentage) 
of top-down 
action plans 
4 
(40%) 
17 
(71%) 
3 
(19%) 
3 
(30%) 
5 
(83%) 
27 
(60%) 
Example of 
a top-down 
action plan 
Develop 
lithium ion 
batteries as new 
business 
Design 
controllers for 
airport conveyor 
systems  
Increase 
product 
variety for 
foreign 
markets 
Reposition 
between 
electrical and 
pneumatic 
drives 
Implement 
new 
smelting 
reactor 
technology 
Acquire dry-
machining 
technology 
know-how 
Number 
(percentage) 
of bottom-up 
action plans 
6 
(60%) 
7 
(29%) 
13 
(81%) 
7 
(70%) 
1 
(17%) 
18 
(40%) 
Example of 
a bottom-up 
action plan 
Integrate 
inbound and 
manufacturing 
logistics 
Redesign testing 
and reclamation 
processes 
Increase 
process 
flexibility 
Segment plant 
into “fast” and 
“slow” 
processes 
Reduce 
energy cost 
in smelting 
process 
Implement 
logistics train 
for route-
oriented parts 
supply 
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AUTO is a production unit of a German premium car manufacturer and has about 2,500 
employees. AUTO manufactures key components of chassis and drivetrains; it is an 
internal systems supplier that competes against external competitors for production 
orders. The plant makes just-in-sequence deliveries of its systems to an assembly plant 
located on the other side of town. Top management states that the competitive priorities 
of AUTO are to be the “first most innovative and second most efficient supplier of power 
train systems”. Decision making in AUTO’s matrix organization is decentralized; as 
described by the unit head, “functions and processes in our matrix [organization] make 
and adjust as many decisions among themselves as possible, I only intervene if no 
consensus is reached.” Six out of ten ongoing action plans were formed bottom-up and 
focused mostly on improving material flows and manufacturing processes. 
CONTROLLERS, with approximately 700 employees, manufactures highly 
customized power controllers and switching cabinets for industrial automation control. 
Located in East Germany, CONTROLLERS was bought by a German-based global electrical 
engineering conglomerate in 1990, after the fall of the Iron Curtain. Once purchased, 
CONTROLLERS had to reinvent itself and moved into the expanding niche of highly 
customized machine controllers and power units; it also offered peripheral services of all-
in-one engineering and project management. The unit head of CONTROLLERS describes its 
competitive priorities as “first technology leadership, second balanced growth in all 
business segments, and third total cost leadership.” CONTROLLERS is organized in a 
matrix format, by product, and centralizes its decision-making authority with the top 
management team. According to the unit head: “The more strategic an issue is, the 
stronger my involvement in decision making. At the end of the day I make such 
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decisions.” Of its 24 action plans, 17 were classified as top-down. The unit head seemed 
to take the most active role in formulating action plans, which emphasized product 
adaptations to new markets. 
MEDICAL is a family-owned firm—a “small or medium-sized enterprise” 
(SME)—that develops and manufactures medical devices for ambulances and homes; it 
has a total of some 800 employees. The heads of manufacturing and technology and of 
sales are members of the owner family, who identify MEDICAL’s competitive priorities as 
“first product innovation and second internationalization, where the latter should be 
reached by modularized customization.” MEDICAL has a functional structure 
characterized by decentralized decision making, wherein substantial autonomy is given to 
lower-level managers. The head of manufacturing explained that frontline production 
managers are “entitled to develop and decide on their own key performance indicator 
systems within their production teams.” Of the 16 action plans at MEDICAL, 13 are 
classified as bottom-up; they concentrated on improving the configuration of the firm’s 
modular manufacturing operations. 
DRIVES is a manufacturing unit of a German industrial control and automation 
company with nearly 2,400 employees. The plant manufactures pneumatic and electric 
drives for factory automation applications in various industries. The top management of 
DRIVES describes the unit’s strategic focus as “customer orientation with delivery speed 
and reliability as top priorities.” DRIVES has a divisional structure and grants considerable 
autonomy to lower-level managers. The unit head explained: “All decisions should be 
made at the most operational level as possible. I will not interfere with these decisions; I 
will only ensure that the decision-making processes follow our principles and standards.” 
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Seven out of ten action plans at DRIVES were initiated bottom-up and focused on 
changing the configuration of intrafirm material logistics and manufacturing processes. 
GLASS is the division of a German glass manufacturer that develops, 
manufactures, and sells specialty glass tubes for applications in pharmaceutical, 
electronics, and environmental technologies worldwide. GLASS has about 1,000 
employees and a functional structure of organization. Its competitive priorities are “on 
technology leadership and delivery reliability, with cost being a constraint.” According to 
top management at GLASS, which consists of the division manager and the heads of 
various functions, “[we] make all key decisions” and delegate decisions only to the 
subunits that have “earned our trust by a consistent track record of performance.” Five of 
the division’s six action plans were top-down and focused on developing new smelting 
technology and improving smelting process control. 
FITTINGS is a manufacturing unit of a German sanitary fittings company; it 
competes globally in the medium and premium price segment of brass faucets. The unit is 
a leading high-technology plant with 530 employees, and it is the only unit that 
incorporates all key processes of the company’s global production network. The 
competitive priorities at FITTINGS are “high flexibility, time to market, and the optimum 
balance between availability, inventory, costs, and quality to reinforce corporate goals 
and brand value.” FITTINGS is organized by functions with a centralized decision-making 
system. The unit head boasted: “All key decisions are made centrally by us [top 
management], and … execution is tightly monitored with the help of our NATO-inspired 
manufacturing dashboard in our executive control room.” Of the unit’s 45 action plans, 
27 were classified as top-down and 18 as bottom-up. Most of the action plans involved 
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new materials and metal founding technologies or making improvements in the flow of 
materials among manufacturing operations. 
5. Cross-Case Analysis 
The cross-case analysis is performed in three steps. First, we compare top-down and 
bottom-up action plans across organizations and investigate the factors that might affect 
the extent to which actions are stipulated by top management or emerged from lower-
level managers. The second step of cross-case analysis focuses on the process of how 
action plans are formed in practice and interact with competitive priorities and objectives 
with reference to the top-down process framework articulated by Kim and Arnold (1996). 
In the last step, we take a closer look at the content of action plans by comparing top-
down and bottom-up ones. 
5.1. Organizational Factors and Top-Down versus Bottom-Up Action Plans 
The within-case analysis showed that all six case organizations, which operate in diverse 
markets with different processes, adopted both top-down and bottom-up action plans. 
However, the proportion of these plans that are formed top-down or bottom-up varies 
across organizations. As shown in Table 3, 70% (i.e., 7 of 10) of the action plans adopted 
by DRIVES originated with middle and frontline managers; only 30% (3 of 10) were 
formulated by top management. In the case of CONTROLLERS, 29% (7 of 24) of its action 
plans emerged bottom-up and 71% (17 of 24) were induced top-down. 
In order to explain these differences across organizations, we examine the 
manufacturers’ competitive priorities, organizational structure, and size (i.e., number of 
employees) as factors that could influence the process of formulating operations strategy. 
Competitive Priorities. Despite differences in their products and processes, our 
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case plants had similar emphases with regard to competitive priorities in their respective 
markets. Four plants (AUTO, CONTROLLERS, MEDICAL, and GLASS) identified their first 
priority as innovation in products or technology and their second as cost leadership. 
However, these organizations exhibited varying degrees of adopting top-down 
(respectively 40%, 71%, 19%, and 83%) versus bottom-up (60%, 29%, 81%, and 17%) 
action plans. The remaining two organizations are similarly inconsistent on this score. 
Both DRIVES and FITTINGS identified their first priority as customer service (e.g., 
flexibility and response time) yet adopted top-down (respectively 30% and 60%) and 
bottom-up (70% and 40%) action plans to different degrees. In short, competitive 
priorities do not explain the extent to which top-down versus bottom-up action plans were 
adopted across organizations. 
Organizational Structure. We used centralized versus decentralized 
organizational structure as a sampling criterion because a decentralized (centralized) 
structure tends to involve a wide (narrow) range of organizational members in decision 
making (Siggelkow and Levinthal, 2003) and thereby facilitates (hinders) employee-led 
action plans. Our cross-case comparison of bottom-up action plans supports this 
conjecture. The three decentralized organizations in our sample—namely, AUTO, 
MEDICAL, and DRIVES—adopted more (respectively 60%, 81%, and 70%) action plans 
from middle or frontline managers than did the three centralized organizations—
CONTROLLERS, GLASS, and FITTINGS (29%, 17%, and 40%). 
In decentralized organizations, top management tends to provide fairly broad 
objectives while delegating significant decision-making authority to lower-level 
managers. Within guidelines, middle and frontline managers undertake initiatives to 
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identify their own actions. This is reflected in a comment by DRIVES’ unit head: “Content 
authority should be as much delegated as possible, but this is coupled with everyone’s 
obligation to bring up ideas and initiatives that we can use to develop our unit.” 
In contrast, top management in centralized organizations tends to specify goals 
and actions in as much detail as possible and only occasionally adopts action plans that 
emerge from middle and frontline managers. According to the top manager at FITTINGS, 
“to ensure consistency with our line of attack, it is us [the unit’s top management] who 
trigger and develop the strategic projects. You cannot expect this from lower-level 
managers. They have to do their job, and to them we have mapped out pretty clearly what 
decisions their jobs include. However, if a somewhat good idea bubbles up, [then] we of 
course use that.” Lower-level managers at FITTINGS also confirmed this point when asked 
about strategic actions: “[it is] top management’s responsibility to determine the strategic 
initiatives to fill in the strategic dashboard.” 
Thus, decentralized organizations tend to encourage employee-led action plans 
whereas centralized organizations exercise tight control of actions in daily operations. 
Size. Organizational size (in terms of the number of employees) became a 
sampling criterion because there was a size disparity in our initial sample between plants 
that were decentralized (AUTO with 2,500 employees and DRIVES with 2,400 employees) 
and those that were centralized (CONTROLLERS with 700 employees and FITTINGS with 
530 employees). Without additional cases, the effects of organizational structure and size 
would be conflated. In order to separate the effect of size from that of organizational 
structure, we added a smaller-sized decentralized organization (MEDICAL with 800 
employees) and a larger-sized centralized organization (GLASS with 1,000 employees). 
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Our final sample thus includes three large plants (at least 1,000 employees) and three 
small plants (fewer than 1,000 employees), where centralized and decentralized structures 
were represented by one or two plants of each size (see Table 2). 
That being said, the proportion of bottom-up action plans varied among plants 
with similar headcounts. For example, the three largest plants (AUTO, DRIVES, and 
GLASS) in our sample had (respectively) 10, 10, and 6 action plans at the time of this 
study; of these plans, 60%, 70%, and 17% (respectively) originated with middle and 
frontline managers. The three smallest plants (CONTROLLERS, MEDICAL, and FITTINGS) 
had 24, 16, and 45 action plans underway at the time of this study; of these plans, 29%, 
81%, and 40% emerged bottom-up. Thus, a plant’s number of employees does not seem 
to affect the adoption patterns of bottom-up and top-down action plans across 
organizations. 
5.2. The Integrated Process of Operations Strategy: Top-Down and Bottom-Up 
Our cross-case analysis has so far focused on identifying factors that affect the extent to 
which organizations adopt top-down versus bottom-up action plans. Here, we discuss the 
actual process of how action plans are formed and interact with the plant’s competitive 
priorities and objectives. Our goal is not to document the idiosyncrasies of each 
organization’s operation strategy process but rather to delineate those processes that are 
common to all the sample organizations. Because the existence of bottom-up action plans 
clearly constitutes a deviation from the Kim and Arnold’s (1996) top-down framework 
(hereafter the “KA framework”) shown in Figure 1, we compare and contrast the 
formation processes of top-down and bottom-up action plans with reference to that 
framework. 
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Competitive Priorities and Objectives. All six manufacturing plants were 
consistent in describing the hierarchical planning process for formulating competitive 
priorities and performance objectives under the umbrella of corporate strategy. That 
process consisted of first defining the manufacturing unit’s competitive priorities (e.g., 
innovation, delivery, quality, flexibility, cost) in accordance with the preferred 
competitive dimensions of corporate strategy. In a second step, manufacturing objectives 
were developed to translate those abstract competitive priorities into more concrete and 
measurable performance targets that reflected the relative emphasis placed on each 
dimension of the competitive priorities. It was commonly described as top management’s 
responsibility to establish the relevant priorities and objectives. As summarized in 
Table 2, each plant typically had a top priority (plus a few secondary priorities) and 
maintained the same priorities for about four years. The lone exception was DRIVES, 
whose top management had recently changed its top priority from cost efficiency to 
delivery and redefined its objectives accordingly—in particular, reducing the throughput 
time from customer order to delivery and increasing the number of on-time deliveries. 
We conclude that, in accordance with the KA framework, competitive priorities and 
performance objectives are in large part formulated and implemented by top 
management. 
Action Plans. The formation process of action plans is where practice is most 
divergent from the KA framework. We have documented that each plant in our sample 
had both top-down and bottom-up action plans—a coexistence that is in stark contrast to 
the KA framework, which postulates only top-down action plans. More specifically, that 
framework presumes that action plans are formed by management based on how nearly 
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those plans are expected to satisfy specific objectives and thus to support the 
organization’s competitive priorities. 
The KA framework’s top-down perspective is partly supported by our 
observations. It is top management that selects “strategic initiatives” or “strategic 
projects” among various initiatives and allocates resources to the selected action plans. In 
this regard, the “strategic initiatives” or “strategic projects” of six plants represent the 
action plans that convey top management’s strategic intentions. However, not all action 
plans were formed by top management or in accordance with its stated intentions. Some 
action plans emerged from middle or frontline managers in the absence of, or despite, top 
management’s prior intentions but were later integrated into its strategic direction. 
Bottom-Up Action Plans. Bottom-up action plans usually begin as autonomous 
initiatives of lower-level managers. Given the limited power of these managers to secure 
resources, their autonomous initiatives usually start small and are scaled up by earning 
top management’s support. From the many autonomous initiatives that are launched, top 
management selects only a few as “strategic initiatives” or “strategic projects.” For an 
initiative to earn the status of a high-priority action plan, lower-level managers must 
demonstrate its value-generating potential through early successes. 
Since numerous initiatives were autonomously started and ended by lower-level 
managers, the organizations did not have any record of how many autonomous initiatives 
were underway or of how many never rose to the level of an action plan. It is nonetheless 
evident that, of many autonomous initiatives that emerged from lower management in the 
absence of top management’s prior intentions, only a few are able to demonstrate value-
generating potential and so become one of top management’s action plans. 
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For example, two line managers at DRIVES initiated a physical segmentation of the 
plant. “[We] basically did it overnight without informing higher-level management 
because ‘fast response’ is too expensive to pursue on regular production lines.” These 
managers physically divided their production area into two subplants that relied on 
different process designs, configuring one subplant for high-volume products (to 
maximize cost efficiency with large batch sizes) and the other for low-volume products 
(to achieve shorter lead times, and more flexibility, with small batch sizes). As a result of 
this autonomous initiative, DRIVES was able to shorten its delivery time for small-volume, 
nonstandard orders and could charge a premium for faster delivery to customers. The 
early success of this initiative garnered the attention and support of top management and 
became one of its strategic action plans. The segmented production lines, initially 
implemented for a single product type, became the plant’s default design and was applied 
to the entire manufacturing area. 
Top-Down Action Plans. The formation of top-down action plans closely follows 
the “formulation and implementation” process spelled out by the KA framework. In the 
similar process of translating competitive priorities into performance objectives, top 
management establishes action plans based on specific objectives derived from its desired 
outcomes, and stipulates those plans in detail to lower-level managers. For instance, the 
top management of GLASS initiated the building of a new glass-smelting reactor that 
enabled the plant to produce specialized solar-thermal glass tubes. Top management 
planned this project down to the smallest detail and led it from inception to completion. 
Action Plans and Competitive Priorities. Top-down action plans are formed in 
“deliberate” conformance with the manufacturing plant’s competitive priorities and 
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objectives to realize top management’s strategic intentions. In contrast, bottom-up action 
plans can emerge irrespective of the specified competitive priorities because lower-level 
managers often undertake autonomous initiatives to serve their objectives in line with the 
organization’s overall directions or to pursue new opportunities that can advance their 
career prospects within the organization. To explore this possibility, we assessed how 
many top-down and bottom-up action plans were directly linked to a plant’s first 
priority—which can be assumed to represent top management’s strongest strategic 
intention. Figure 2 compares each manufacturer’s entire set of top-down and bottom-up 
action plans with those that are directly linked to its first priority. 
 
For each organization, the figure’s left bar depicts the top-down and bottom-up 
proportions of all action plans while the right bar does likewise for those action plans that 
Figure 2: Comparison of Top-Down and Bottom-Up Strategic Action Plans vis-à-vis First Priority 
All 1st Priority 
Top-Down 3 1 
Bottom-Up 7 2 
0% 
25% 
50% 
75% 
100% 
S
h
a
re
 
Action Plans 
DRIVES 
Top-Down 
Bottom-Up 
All 1st Priority 
Top-Down 5 2 
Bottom-Up 1 0 
0% 
25% 
50% 
75% 
100% 
S
h
a
re
 
Action Plans 
GLASS 
Top-Down 
Bottom-Up 
All 1st Priority 
Top-Down 27 11 
Bottom-Up 18 2 
0% 
25% 
50% 
75% 
100% 
S
h
a
re
 
Action Plans 
FITTINGS 
Top-Down 
Bottom-Up 
All 1st Priority 
Top-Down 4 3 
Bottom-Up 6 1 
0% 
25% 
50% 
75% 
100% 
S
h
a
re
 
Action Plans 
AUTO 
Top-Down 
Bottom-Up 
All 1st Priority 
Top-Down 17 6 
Bottom-Up 7 1 
0% 
25% 
50% 
75% 
100% 
S
h
a
re
 
Action Plans 
CONTROLLERS 
Top-Down 
Bottom-Up 
All 1st Priority 
Top-Down 3 1 
Bottom-Up 13 1 
0% 
25% 
50% 
75% 
100% 
S
h
a
re
 
Action Plans 
MEDICAL 
Top-Down 
Bottom-Up 
 27 
are directly linked to the organization’s first priority. A visual inspection of these bar 
graphs reveals that, for each organization, top-down dynamics account for more of the 
“priority” action plans than for the overall action plans (i.e., the top-down proportion is 
greater for the right than for the left bar). The only exception is DRIVES, for which the 
two proportions are roughly equal. By and large, an action plan linked to the 
organization’s first priority is more likely to be formed top-down than bottom-up. This 
finding indicates that bottom-up action plans tend to emerge outside formally specified 
priorities whereas top-down action plans are more likely formulated in line with them. 
Integrating Top-Down and Bottom-Up Processes. The process of forming 
operations strategy at our case organizations exhibits both similarities to and differences 
from the KA framework. To reconcile our findings with that framework and to refine the 
conceptual model of forming operations strategy, we propose an integrated process of 
strategy formation that encompasses both top-down and bottom-up action plans; see 
Figure 3. 
As mentioned, the hierarchical process of planning competitive priorities, 
performance objectives, and top-down action plans is similar to the KA framework’s 
“formulation and implementation” procedure. The major departure from that framework 
is the process of bottom-up action plans that emerge from lower-level management. 
Middle and frontline managers undertake numerous autonomous initiatives on a small 
scale regardless of top management’s prior intentions. Of these, only a few initiatives 
exhibit the potential to generate value and are elevated to a high-priority action plan by 
top management’s support. Thus from here on, autonomous initiatives by lower-level 
managers become integrated into top management’s strategic intentions. 
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No matter how they originate, all action plans are evaluated in terms of their contribution 
to the organization’s goals and objectives. Some action plans may deliver the desired 
outcomes and can fit into the current strategic direction while others may require certain 
adjustments. Based on the respective outcomes, top management reevaluates the action 
plans as well as the plant’s objectives and competitive priorities, and reaffirms or 
modifies the organization’s strategic direction. 
Given the unplanned nature of a bottom-up action plan, which typically emerges 
outside pre-specified priorities, its outcome—if successful—can alter top management’s 
intentions and reshape the organization’s competitive priorities. A case in point is 
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DRIVE’s plant segmentation: it was initiated by two line managers for a single product 
type yet was later, with the support of top management, scaled up to be applied to the 
entire manufacturing area. This action plan improved not only the plant’s delivery 
performance but also its profitability (through price premiums for low-volume, 
nonstandard products). These successful outcomes led DRIVE’s top management to shift 
its first priority to timeliness of delivery and away from cost efficiency, the priority 
formerly dictated by corporate headquarters. This example supports our contention that 
operations strategy formation is an iterative process of integrating competitive priorities, 
objectives, and action plans and that it incorporates both top-down planning and bottom-
up learning because top management’s strategic intentions is shaped, at least in part, by 
lessons from daily operations. 
5.3. Content of Top-Down and Bottom-Up Action Plans 
In this section, we explore the content of action plans to gain further insight into the areas 
in which bottom-up or top-down action plans are formed. Our previous mapping of action 
plans to a plant’s first priority suggests that bottom-up action plans pursue improvement 
opportunities outside specified priorities whereas top-down action plans are formulated 
with those priorities in mind. To learn more about the specific content of top-down and 
bottom-up action plans, we pooled them by type across organizations and then grouped 
them into similar content categories. This sorting process was iterated until we obtained 
the fewest number of internally consistent categories, which resulted in action plans being 
categorized as follows: (1) new product and/or technologies, (2) organization and 
coordination, (3) methods and routines, or (4) manufacturing and supply chain process. 
Action plans in the first category are associated with the introduction of new products or 
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technologies; those in the second category focus on the organization’s overarching 
governance and coordination structure. Action plans in the third category consist of 
advancing methods and routines in problem solving that could eventually contribute to 
process improvement, and those in the fourth category address changes in process 
improvement. The construct validity of this classification was confirmed by 
representatives from top management (cf. Yin, 2009) and is summarized in Table 4.  
Table 4: Top-Down and Bottom-Up Action Plans—Breakdown by Content Category 
 Content AUTO CONTR. MEDICAL DRIVES GLASS FITTINGS Average 
Top- 
down 
New products & technology 2 9 1 0 3 3 35% 
Organization & coordination 1 4 1 2 0 6 28% 
Methods & routines 1 0 0 1 0 3 12% 
Mfg. & supply chain process 0 4 1 0 2 15 25% 
 Total 4 17 3 3 5 27 100% 
Bottom-
up 
New products & technology 1 1 5 1 0 0 17% 
Organization & coordination 1 0 0 0 0 0 3% 
Methods & routines 1 0 1 2 0 6 11% 
Mfg. & supply chain process 3 6 7 4 1 12 69% 
 Total 6 7 13 7 1 18 100% 
 
Our sample manufacturers had varying numbers of action plans underway at the time of 
the study and thus exhibit different proportions of action plans by content category (note 
the many zeros in Table 4). To compare the strategic content of top-down and bottom-up 
action plans, we aggregated plans across organizations by averaging the proportions of 
each content category, as shown in the rightmost column of Table 4. Using the 
aggregated proportions—instead of pooling action plans across organizations and then 
calculating the proportions—allows us to preclude bias that could arise from the different 
sample sizes. Figure 4 compares the aggregated proportions of contents between top-
down and bottom-up action plans. 
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Our qualitative analysis of the strategic content of top-down and the bottom-up action 
plans yields some interesting observations, as the two types of plans tend to address 
different strategic foci. Top-down action plans primarily involve new products and 
technologies (35%) or organization and coordination (28%); these trends are summarized 
by the left bar in Figure 4. In contrast, bottom-up action plans predominantly focus on 
manufacturing and supply chain processes (69%) and, to a lesser extent, on new products 
and technologies (17%); see the right bar in Figure 4. 
The strategic emphases of top-down action plans on the development of new 
products and technology and on organization and coordination is consistent with the 
sample firms’ competitive priorities. Innovation in products or technology was the top 
priority in four plants (AUTO, CONTROLLERS, MEDICAL, and GLASS), and cost leadership 
was their second priority. From the interviews, we learned that the unit head of 
CONTROLLERS formulated all action plans for new products and technologies himself 
while delegating to lower-level managers all issues related to changes in the 
Figure 4: The Contents of Top-Down and Bottom-Up Strategic Action Plans 
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manufacturing process. When this unit head launched a new airport conveyor business, 
he was directly involved with the development of new engineering capabilities and led 
the coordination efforts with external partners. When asked about the process-related 
initiatives, he replied: “I realized that for manufacturing issues you should rely on the 
experts who are in the processes.” Similarly, the top management of AUTO is directly 
involved in all new product/technology-related action plans to “drive the [corporate] 
business strategy into our manufacturing organization.” 
At the same time, the selective focus of bottom-up action plans on improvements 
in manufacturing and supply chain processes can be explained by lower-level managers’ 
tacit knowledge in this area. For instance, the development of new products or 
technologies requires extensive expertise not only on manufacturing processes but also on 
market trends, customers, and competitors. Since their power to secure resources is 
relatively limited, lower-level managers eventually require top management’s support for 
the success of any autonomous initiatives in the area of new product or technology 
development. In contrast, middle and even frontline managers can readily—and are often 
encouraged to—initiate process improvements that are based on their own tacit 
knowledge. Autonomous initiatives are undertaken by lower-level managers in part to 
advance their career prospects; hence they evaluate such initiatives in terms of the 
likelihood of success and thus tend to remain within their own areas of expertise. In turn, 
top management is more confident about betting on bottom-up action plans in those areas 
of operational practices and processes that are “owned” by lower-level managers. The top 
management of AUTO elaborated on this point as follows: “[We] can only survive when 
we incorporate and implement all valuable ideas, and many outstanding ideas simply 
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come from deep inside the plant, benefitting from the expertise that resides in our 
operational processes.” At AUTO, such expertise helped solve the plant’s long-standing 
problem of maintaining productivity and quality levels with an aging workforce. In 
particular, a quality control manager decided to experiment with various compositions of 
staff ages on an existing production line as a test of the productivity and quality 
performance of older workers. Relying on this manager’s expertise, the unit head signed 
off on the experiment and provided resources that enabled its implementation as a high-
priority initiative. This bottom-up action plan was instrumental in reaching the production 
line’s quality goal (namely, no more than ten defective items per million produced) 
within three months, to achieve zero defects within a year, and to improve productivity 
by 7%. The top management of AUTO then integrated the knowledge gained from this 
action plan into its guiding production principles and implemented the plan throughout its 
globally applied production system (Loch et al., 2010). 
We can therefore summarize these results by stating that top-down and bottom-up 
action plans complement, rather than compete with, each other with regard to their 
strategic content. Top-down action plans are formulated to support top management’s 
strategic intentions, and bottom-up action plans pursue diverse opportunities for 
improvement in the areas of operational practices and processes—which are important to 
top management but in the hindsight of its strategic focus. 
6. Discussion 
This study investigates the formation of operations strategy in practice and proposes an 
integrated process—encompassing both top-down and bottom-up procedures—based on 
analysis of the 111 (59 top-down and 52 bottom-up) action plans of six German 
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manufacturing plants. A bottom-up action plan is defined as an initiative by middle or 
frontline management irrespective of top management’s prior intentions; a top-down 
action plan is one that is initiated or stipulated by top management. Investigating how 
these two types of action plans are formed in practice, and also how they interact with 
competitive priorities and objectives, allows us to augment Kim and Arnold’s (1996) top-
down framework by documenting action plans that emerge bottom-up. 
As summarized in Table 2, our within-case analysis establishes that all six case 
organizations have, albeit in varying degrees, both top-down and bottom-up action plans. 
Top-down action plans are formulated and implemented to achieve specific objectives in 
a hierarchical planning process by which the operation’s competitive priorities are 
defined in accordance with corporate strategy and then translated into performance 
targets. In contrast, bottom-up action plans emerge from autonomous initiatives in the 
exploratory process of lower-level managers’ search for new opportunities. Of numerous 
initiatives, only those few with some value-generating potential are selected as high-
priority action plans and subsequently integrated into top management’s strategic 
intentions. Yet regardless of their origins, all action plans are evaluated based on their 
contributions to the organization’s goals and objectives. Depending on the outcomes, top 
management may either reinforce or modify elements of its strategy, including objectives 
and competitive priorities. Operations strategy is thus formed through an iterative process 
of integrating competitive priorities, objectives, and action plans that are partly induced 
by top-down planning and partly emerge from bottom-up learning. This integrated 
process of operations strategy formation, as illustrated in Figure 3, is summarized in the 
following proposition. 
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Proposition 1. Operations strategy formation is an iterative process of 
integrating competitive priorities, objectives, and action plans and encompasses 
top-down planning as well as bottom-up learning—of which the latter shapes, at 
least in part, top management’s strategic intentions. 
 
Although all six sample organizations incorporate both types of action plans, they showed 
varying proportions of top-down versus bottom-up plans. In order to identify the factors 
that led to these observed differences, we examined competitive priorities, organizational 
structure, and firm size (as measured by number of employees). The cross-case analysis 
indicated no systematic patterns in the proportions of top-down and bottom-up action 
plans with regard to competitive priorities and size, but it did indicate a notable difference 
between centralized and decentralized organizations: the latter adopted relatively more 
bottom-up plans than did the former. Our interviews with organization members at all 
three management levels (top, middle, and frontline) revealed that, in decentralized firms, 
top management provides broad objectives but tends to delegate to lower-level managers 
a significant amount of decision making with respect to their actions. In centralized 
organizations, however, top management tends to specify goals and actions in as much 
detail as possible, leaving little discretion to lower-level managers. As a result, bottom-up 
action plans are more likely to arise within a decentralized organizational structure—
where decision-making authority is distributed across organizational layers—than in a 
centralized structure characterized by concentrated decision-making authority. We state 
this result formally in our next proposition. 
Proposition 2. A decentralized organizational structure encourages bottom-up 
action plans to a greater extent than does a centralized organizational structure. 
 36 
Finally, we investigated the strategic content of top-down and bottom-up action plans and 
the extent to which they are consistent with the organization’s competitive priorities. We 
first assessed how many top-down and bottom-up action plans were directly linked to a 
plant’s first priority, or top management’s strongest strategic intention. As shown in 
Figure 2, more top-down than bottom-up action plans addressed the organization’s first 
priority. When action plans were grouped into similar content categories, a noteworthy 
difference was evident in the strategic emphases of top-down versus bottom-up action 
plans: as shown in Figure 4, top-down action plans focus mainly on new products and 
technology (35%) and somewhat less so on organization and coordination (28%). The 
result is in line with the first and the second priorities specified by our case organizations. 
Innovation in products or technology was the top priority of four plants (AUTO, 
CONTROLLERS, MEDICAL, and GLASS), for which cost leadership was the second priority 
(see Table 2). This finding confirms that top-down action plans are formulated via a 
hierarchical planning process and reflect top management’s strategic intentions with 
regard to the organization’s competitive priorities. 
In contrast, bottom-up action plans address manufacturing and supply chain 
processes (69%) much more than they do new products or technologies (17%). This 
selective focus of bottom-up action plans on process improvement can be explained by 
the tacit knowledge of lower-level managers in this area. The interviews indicated that 
such managers are frequently encouraged to undertake autonomous initiatives involving 
process improvements; however, they will likely face organizational constraints when 
seeking to initiate the development of new products or technologies without top 
management’s support. Because the value-generating potential of their initiatives must be 
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demonstrated by early successes, lower-level managers tend to propose action plans that 
lie within their domains of expertise. In this vein, top management relies on the 
operational expertise of middle and frontline managers and therefore tends to adopt 
bottom-up action plans in the areas of operational practices and processes. Thus, top-
down and bottom-up action plans serve complementary roles in operations strategy. 
Whereas top-down plans are more likely formulated in line with top management’s 
specified priorities and strategic intentions, bottom-up action plans tend to pursue diverse 
opportunities for improvement in operational practices and processes that are outside the 
main strategic focus of top management. These considerations lead to our final 
proposition as follows. 
Proposition 3. Top-down action plans are more likely formulated to support the 
specified priorities, whereas bottom-up action plans tend to pursue diverse 
improvement opportunities in operational practices and processes beyond top 
management’s current strategic focus. 
 
7. Contributions and Limitations 
This study makes several contributions to the operations strategy literature. First, it fills a 
void in the research on operations strategy by investigating the formation process that 
governs interactions among competitive priorities, performance objectives, and action 
plans. This “micro-level” process of operations strategy formation has received scant 
attention whereas the “macro-level” formation process within an organizational hierarchy 
has been investigated by numerous studies (Barnes, 2002; Marucheck et al., 1990; Menda 
and Dilts, 1997; Schroeder et al., 1986; Skinner, 1969; Swamidass, 1986; Swamidass et 
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al., 2001; Ward et al., 1996; Ward and Duray, 2000; Wheelwright, 1984). An important 
exception is the work of Kim and Arnold (1996), which grounds the process of operations 
strategy at the micro level and investigates the internal consistency of priorities, 
objectives, and action plans. However, that paper presupposes the dominant, top-down 
view of “formulation and implementation” in operations strategy and largely neglects 
bottom-up initiatives. 
Our second contribution is thus to substantiate the bottom-up aspect of operations 
strategy formation by documenting and examining action plans that emerge via the 
autonomous initiatives of lower-level managers. Building on Kim and Arnold’s top-down 
framework, we develop an integrated process model of operations strategy formation and 
thereby contribute to a mid-range extension of that theory. To the best of our knowledge, 
this study is the first attempt to integrate the top-down and bottom-up perspectives in the 
internal process of operations strategy formation. 
Third, this research enhances the field’s understanding of top-down and bottom-
up processes by identifying a contingency factor—centralized versus decentralized 
organizational structure—that affects the relative extent of top-down planning and 
bottom-up learning within an organization. Finally, in this paper we investigate the 
strategic content of top-down and bottom-up action plans and develop novel insights into 
their complementary roles in operations strategy. 
Our research also offers several managerial implications.  First, our case studies 
demonstrate how bottom-up initiatives embody opportunities for improvement as well as 
for refining a plant’s competitive priorities. Such opportunities would be omitted in a 
pure top-down formation process of operations strategy. For example, DRIVES’ 
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reprioritization of goals would not have happened without the unsolicited inputs from two 
line managers, and it offered a competitive advantage (speed) that the original strategy 
had not foreseen. Similarly, AUTO’s quality and productivity goals would have hardly 
been achieved by its aging workforce if the quality control manager’s experiment would 
have been disapproved by top management. This value, once understood, can motivate 
senior managers to risk a perceived loss of control by opening up the strategy process to 
ideas from the bottom. Moreover, our results also suggest where the typical domains of 
bottom-up proposals may lie—practices and processes in operations and supply chain 
management. 
Second, our results emphasize the importance of not only organizational 
structures but also organizational culture that can facilitate or hinder “autonomous 
initiatives”. Employee-led initiatives do not happen in a vacuum, but rather in an 
environment where diverse ideas are valued and shared among organizational members. 
Thus, top managers should establish an organizational environment that encourages 
employees to try new ideas with regard to improving their work and that provides 
communication channels to share ideas with other members in the organization as well as 
across organizational hierarchy.  
As is the case with most studies, ours also has limitations. The most obvious is 
that our sample, though heterogeneous in terms of industries and manufacturing 
processes, consists only of German plants. Generalizing the proposed model requires 
research that compares and contrasts the related practices observed in various 
manufacturing organizations located in other countries. Moreover, even though our 
examining sets of current action plans has yielded useful insights into strategy formation 
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by manufacturing organizations, the case studies we employ rely on cross-sectional data 
collected at a single point in time—a limitation due to the geographical and time 
constraints on our research. If the progress of autonomous initiatives were observed over 
time and from their inception, we could additionally collect information on the initiatives 
that were not selected as action plans and thus derive insights concerning why different 
initiatives become relatively more (or less) integrated into top management’s strategic 
intentions. For these reasons, our study is suited more to build theory about the bottom-up 
process of operations strategy formation than to providing normative guidance regarding 
the relative effectiveness of various autonomous initiatives. Future studies would thus 
benefit from a longitudinal approach that follows the progress of strategic initiatives over 
time. 
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Appendix: Condensed Interview Protocol  
 
A. Questions to Top Management 
 
A.1. Operations Strategy and Competitive Priorities 
 
1. How would you summarize the strategy of your plant? 
2. What are the competitive priorities of your plant and how do you rank them? 
3. How was the strategy of your plant formed?  
4. How would you characterize the plant’s role in the corporate manufacturing network? 
5. How is your plant’s strategy related to corporate strategy? 
6. How did the operations strategy evolve over time, and if so, why did it change? 
7. How do you implement the operations strategy in the plant?  
 
A.2. Strategic Projects  
 
1. What are the “strategic projects” [need to figure out company terminology] that are 
currently being implanted in the plant with top management support? 
2. What are the goals of these strategic projects? 
3. Who initiated the strategic projects and who is involved in developing these projects? 
4. What is the content of the strategic project and how did that evolve? 
5. How did these projects become “strategic projects”? 
6. How did or will these strategic projects affect the plant’s capabilities and strategy? 
 
A.3. Centralization vs. Decentralization 
 
1. What are your main decision areas? 
2. What decision authorities have been delegated to middle and frontline management? 
3. To what extent do you decide on the formulation of operations strategy and on the 
implementation of strategic projects? 
3. To what extent do you empower lower level employees to pursue their own initiatives? 
 
B. Questions to Middle and Frontline Management 
 
B.1. Operations Strategy and Competitive Priorities 
 
1. How would you summarize the strategy of your plant? 
2. What are the competitive priorities of your plant and how would you rank them? 
3. How does the operations strategy affect your organizational unit?  
4. How would you characterize your organizational unit’s role and function within the 
plant? 
5. How does your organizational unit contribute to the plant’s strategy? 
 
B.2. Strategic Projects 
 
1. What are the “strategic projects” your organizational unit is currently involved with? 
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2. What are the goals of these strategic projects? 
3. Who initiated these strategic projects and who is involved in developing these 
projects?  
4. In which other strategic project were you involved? [Discuss remaining list of strategic 
projects.] 
4. What is the content of the strategic projects and how did that evolve? 
5. How did these projects become “strategic projects”? 
 
B.3. Centralization vs. Decentralization 
 
1. What are your main decision areas? 
2. What decision authorities have been centralized at higher level management? 
3. What decision authorities have been delegated to lower level management?  
4. To what extent are you empowered to decide on the implementation of strategic 
projects? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
